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I. Shea’s Project 
Cognitive science is rife with talk of representations. The brain builds navigation-guiding spatial 
representations from the activity of place-specific cells in hippocampus (Ekstrom et al. 2003, 
Derdikman and Moser 2010). Computational models of visual processing include edge-detectors, 
which contribute to object-categorization via matching of portions of a constructed image to 
stored representations of categories (Marr 1982), which matching then leads to category-
appropriate behavior. A given level of activation in midbrain dopamine neurons represents the 
difference between the predicted payoff of an action taken and the actual payoff of that action, 
with the effect, in some circumstances, of decreasing the probability that such behavior will be 
produced in the future (Schultz 1998). The development of a certain theory-like structure confers 
upon the child the capacity to represent, and thus categorize and reason about, mammals (Carey 
1985). A given symbol string represents the syntactic structure of a heard sentence, and thereby 
facilitates the production of a content-relevant verbal response (Chomsky 1980). And so on. 
Sometimes cognitive scientists talk of concepts, symbols, or knowledge structures, rather than of 
representations; but despite what can be important differences (in complexity of the units 
involved, for example), common threads run through the discussion of all such structures. They 
are about the feature (or property, or kind, or individual – take this as read hereafter) represented; 
 
1 An earlier version of this material was presented at the workshop Representation in Cognitive Science, held at 
Ruhr University, Bochum, Feb. 3–4, 2020. My thanks to Tobias Schlicht and everyone who helped to organize the 
event and to the audience members, including Nick Shea, for fruitful discussion. 
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they stand in for it, depict it, track it, correspond to it, or are accurate when applied to it. 
Moreover, the structures in question either directly or indirectly help to produce behavior 
responsive to or distinctively directed toward what they are about (or depict, etc.). 
 Philosophers naturally wonder, then, what makes a given structure a representation of this 
particular feature, rather than some other. In his brilliant book, Representation in Cognitive 
Science, Nicholas Shea makes substantive progress on these questions, and he does so by 
attending, in a careful, empirically informed way, to the role that representations play in 
cognitive-scientific modeling. The result is what Shea calls ‘Varitel Semantics’. According to 
Varitel Semantics, cognitive agents execute task functions; they successfully perform certain 
tasks consistently and robustly, that is, across a significantly varying range of contexts and input 
values. And, in cases in which representations are in play, agents’ doing so is best explained by 
their implementation of algorithms (75)2 operating over nonsemantically characterized vehicles.3 
Suppressing some details, a vehicle’s representational content is whatever correlation or 
structural correspondence figures into the best causal explanation of the stabilization of a robust 
task function (83, 200), that is, the correlation or correspondence that accounts for the successful 
execution of task function (and the algorithm that supports it) (56, 69, 167, 199); where 
representations appear, stabilization and robustness are causally explained partly by the 
correlation or correspondence between vehicles over which the algorithm in question operates 
and existing features in the world (preferably objectively existing ones – 90, 122, 155, 158).4 
Three kinds of causal process can explain the stabilization of task functions: evolutionary 
 
2 All page references are to Representation in Cognitive Science, unless otherwise indicated. 
3 That is, symbols or other units that are characterized in terms other than semantic or representational terms, similar 
to characterizing a word by the letters that are strung together to make it up. 
4 Cf. the discussion of the natural-kinds-only assumption in Rupert (1999, 344–348) 
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processes, individual learning, or the contribution of the performance of the task function to 
ongoing persistence.5 
 As a brief illustration,6 consider subjects who are trained to distinguish two kinds of 
images, As and Bs, based on the visual features of the stimuli. In doing so, subjects’ cognitive or 
neural systems form “hidden” units (in contrast to input units that detect visual features) the 
activation of which corresponds systematically to the appearance of relevant stimuli, a1...an, 
b1...bn . Such hidden units cluster into two groups, each of which causes one of two responses, 
‘A’ or ‘B’ (which then, in a whole-agent system, might cause a further action, of, e.g., putting a4 
into bin A). The best explanation of how the subject acquired the ability to perform this task 
function appeals to the correlation between units over which the categorization algorithm 
operates and the corresponding individuals in the environment. Because that correlation was in 
place during training, subjects frequently succeeded in the categorization task, which success led 
to reward and thus to the entrenchment of the categorization algorithm in question. Thus, the 
units in question represent the corresponding individuals a1...an, b1...bn.  
II. Content without Function or Success 
I applaud Shea’s methodology, particularly the extent to which he treats the question of 
representational content as an issue in philosophy of science. I’m concerned, however, that Shea 
reads into cognitive science too deep a normative dimension,7 despite Shea’s attempts to distance 
 
5 Shea also recognizes the possibility that a system can perform a function because it’s been assigned that function 
by an external system, a human agent, for example. Shea mostly sidelines these cases, however, because they do not 
shed light on the ultimate determinants of content; they do not help us to understand how representational content 
appears in the first instance, that is, how underived content can appear in a natural world; for such cases presupposes 
that the agent’s intentions already have content, which content effects the assignment of function (9, 65). 
     Note that, throughout, I focus on learning and evolutionary selection as sources of stabilization, in contrast to 
persistence-related considerations. The role of persistence-related processes strikes me as provocative and worthy of 
further exploration but also as raising a host of complications and unaddressed questions treatment of which is 
prevented by limitations of space.  
6 This is a simplified version of the example discussed at (91–93). 
7 In the philosopher’s sense of ‘normative’ – having to do with good, bad, right, wrong, ought, and should. 
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himself from the normative perspective (65); for Shea’s project rests fundamentally on the 
distinction between successful and unsuccessful behavior. On Shea’s view, the very target of 
representational explanation in cognitive science “is a pattern of successful behavior of a system 
in its environment” (22). In fact, for Shea, if a creature has not been in existence long enough to 
have had the computing of a definite function stabilized for robust application, representational 
content does not (yet) exist in that creature; if nothing counts determinately as behavioral success 
– behavior that has been stabilized because it is successful – there are no representations, on 
Shea’s view (69, 167). 
 This seems to me to misrepresent the structure of cognitive science. The target of its 
explanations is not, inherently, a matter of behavioral success and failure. Rather, cognitive 
science is, first and foremost, an attempt to model processes that produce, in human behavior, 
deviations from the null hypothesis. More generally speaking, humans exhibit a range of 
unexpected, unusual, or distinctive forms of behavior – from the products of art to architecture to 
game play to social interaction to theorem proving – and cognitive science has bet that a 
dedicated, relatively unified scientific endeavor can explain them.8 For example, the null 
hypothesis predicts that the text on a page that a subject has been exposed to visually will not 
correlate with what the subject produces when asked, at a later time, to provide written answers 
to questions about that page of text;9 moreover, the null hypothesis predicts that the subject’s 
 
8 “What questions should a theory of problem solving answer?” Newell, Shaw, and Simon asked at the dawn of 
cognitive science; and responding to their own question, “First, it should predict the performance of a problem 
solver handling specified tasks” (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1958, 151). 
9 In a rigorously worked-out case, such questions themselves would be scored by an independent measure, so as to 
qualify for the status of being, as we would normally say, “about the original text.” When designing and running 
experiments, researchers sometimes take for granted their ability to recognize such relations as “being relevant 
questions about text x,” but frequently efforts are made to ground such assumptions, by, e.g., asking subjects to 
score questions or by using analytic methods such as correlation-based tools (deploying latent semantic analysis, for 
instance). Ultimately, though, even such approaches must take something tentatively for granted, for example, 
taking a corpus as given. But, cognitive science faces no special problem here that reliance on normativity might 
solve. Every science faces the foundational problem of grouping together phenomena or data sets for study, judging 
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being asked to produce written answers does not modulate the strength of the (null) correlation 
between the text the subject was exposed to and the written text the subject produces after 
exposure. But, in fact, human populations deviate significantly from the null hypothesis in both 
respects.10 If it is not clear, I’ve described performance on a reading comprehension exam by 
those who, as we would say informally, speak the same language as that in which the text is 
written and is spoken by those administering the test. In the everyday human case, in literate 
societies, we observe significant deviations from the null hypothesis: the subject population of 
interest – speakers of the same language – produces answers systematically correlated with 
aspects of the written text; and they do so at an even higher rate when they’ve been asked 
specifically to write about that text by experimenters with whom they share a language. The job 
of cognitive science is to model the mechanisms and processes that mediate such correlations.11 
This vision of cognitive science does not essentially involve success or failure – despite the fact 
that more than one parent has responded to a child’s school results in such terms. 
 Thus, although it’s natural to consider some patterns of behavior as successful or 
unsuccessful, the doing of cognitive science – model building, model selection – does not take 
the explanation of successful behavior as its central goal. This is no surprise; it is the pattern seen 
throughout the sciences. Humans place various natural phenomena in normative categories. 
Hurricanes and turbulence are bad, while bumper crops and sunny days are good; but the 
explananda of meteorology, fluid dynamics, and agricultural science are not success and failure, 
 
them to be part of a family of related phenomena and guessing that the treatment of them as such will prove fruitful. 
If judgments about which texts go together in a corpus or judgements concerning the measure to use to determine 
that subjects speak the same language as the experimenters do not lead to fruitful experimental results, then it’s back 
to the drawing board.  
10 Which populations? Those who speak and read the language in which the experiment is conducted. Perhaps that’s 
identified by clustering together those whose average length of verbal interaction with each other deviates 
significantly from baseline, which measure might operationalize “speaking the same language,” depending on the 
context of the interaction. 
11  Cf. the methodological framework for social psychology articulated by de Houwer, Gawronski, and Barnes-
Holmes (2013). 
 6 
qua success and failure. The distinction between any two kinds of outcome can be of interest to a 
science and be the target of a modeling enterprise. It’s of no deep consequence that, in some 
cases, the difference between the two outcomes of interest have positive and negative valence 
attached to them or attitudes directed toward them.12 
 Consider, too, the extent to which cognitive science examines what are thought of as 
dysfunctional or pathological cases, to ask, for instance, what accounts for the difference 
between the actions typical of someone with delusions of grandeur and the actions typical of 
someone with delusions of being dead (Cotard’s syndrome) or to ask why subjects develop one 
delusion rather than the other. Such explanations are likely to be deeply representational, but talk 
of success and failure gets little grip. And less extreme cases abound: surely cognitive science 
would like to detail the mechanisms that produce such arational actions as throwing a 
nonfunctional can-opener across the room in frustration or ruffling the hair of a loved one when 
walking past (Hursthouse 1991), as well as such results as subjects’ unwillingness to eat feces-
shaped pieces of fudge, even when they know full well that what they’re faced with is fudge 
(Gendler 2008). Yet, talk of success and failure makes little sense in these cases. And the list is, 
indeed, quite extensive: schizophrenic reports of auditory hallucinations, perseveration, varying 
patterns of resistance to evidence, construction of individual identity in a social context, 
 
12 This might seem to be too fine a philosophical point, but in this context, it’s worth emphasizing. We do often 
categorize behavioral responses as successes or failures, and we are, in fact, out to explain those responses; so, in an 
indirect sense, we do mean to explain successes and failures. But, cognitive science is not out to explain them as 
successes or failures or to explain their status of ‘being a success’ or ‘being a failure’. Cognitive science is out to 
explain differing patterns of output – the button-pressing did or did not correspond with the appearance of the 
stimuli in question – and often such patterns can be categorized in success-oriented terms, but that success-based 
categorization is, generally speaking, incidental to the logic of scientific modeling. Shea’s project requires that being 
a success or a failure play or more substantive role than that – of being the very thing that the modeling effort aims 
at – which is what I take exception to. (Of course, we might shift gears and attempt to model the psychological 
processes by which subjects produce the judgments that a response is a success or a failure. Why does the parent 
think the child’s ‘D’ on a reading comprehension exam is a bad outcome? Why, more generally, do subjects deviate 
from the null hypothesis in their labeling of behavioral patterns as successes or failures? But that way of pursuing 
questions about behavioral success and failure, as an investigation merely of patterns of labeling actions, reinforces 
the conception of cognitive science I’ve been pressing.)  
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addiction, mimicking of speech patterns and bodily movements of one’s interlocutor, priming-
related behavior, reports of mind-wandering, novelty-seeking behavior, and risk-taking behavior. 
In what sense is it a behavioral success or a failure that, after having been exposed subliminally 
to ‘stamp’, the subject is more likely to generate the word ‘lamp’ when asked to write down 
names of pieces of furniture, the sort of result one observes in a typical priming-based 
experiment? 
 It’s worth considering possible ways to insulate Shea’s project from these concerns. Here 
are two. First, many forms of behavior that seem irrational or pathological can seem objectively 
successful (or unsuccessful) when relativized to the subject’s existing goals. On one reading of 
this response – one that relativizes success to the subject’s explicit goals – it violates Shea’s 
naturalistic ground rules (9, 65); it requires that the content of the subject’s goals already be in 
place.13 Another reading of this proposal appeals to biological imperatives, but this path offers 
scant sustenance. Cognitive scientists should want to identify the mechanisms that produce 
paintings, poetry, and pontification, but there’s no straightforward, nonrepresentational route 
from the biological goals of, say, locating food and shelter to, for instance, the motivation for the 
doodlings on the cover of my notebook. And, to turn to cases of much greater gravity, I doubt 
that such a route, if it were found, would account for the behavior of individuals who are suicidal 
or who, in the case of eating disorders, refuse food. One would think, however, that in all of 
 
13 Shea’s own approach to the typing of vehicles and of syntactically individuated units seems to close off a further 
response, that of appealing to behavioral success and failure to fix content in a range of base cases, and then treating 
content, in the non-success-involving cases, as parasitic on the base cases. On Shea’s view, however, semantic 
content follows sameness of syntactic type, not sameness of vehicle type, yet sameness of syntactic type requires 
that tokens of the same type are “processed the same way by the system” (39). The requirement of sameness in 
processing seems to limit severely the range of cases in which Shea might say that a unit appearing in pathological, 
arational, etc. processing has content on the grounds that the unit also participates in distinct, success-grounded 
processing; the processing of the unit in the base case as contrasted with the other cases would seem to differ to too 
great an extent to preserve syntactic type. This strikes me as a general potential problem with Shea’s approach to 
unit-typing, given how widespread I suspect it is for a unit’s content to be preserved across processing contexts 
(despite the likelihood of contextual shifting of the content attached to a given physically individuated unit – 
Anderson 2014). 
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these cases, the cognitive-scientific explanation of the relevant forms of behavior will appeal to 
representations. 
 A second possible defense of Shea’s conception of cognitive science appeals to the 
determinacy of the functions being computed and its relation to success-conditions. To be clear, 
Shea appeals explicitly and repeatedly to behavioral success and failure, so the concerns 
expressed above strike me as fair. Nevertheless, Shea’s talk of algorithmically computed 
functions sometimes sounds more narrowly focused than any claim about the organism’s 
behavioral output; he’s concerned with the stabilization of a disposition to compute a certain 
function (rather than some other one), and perhaps it goes without saying that the identity of a 
function – in the mathematical sense relevant to the theory of computation – entails 
determinately correct and incorrect outputs. So, Shea might limit his focus to cases involving the 
computation of a specific function, perhaps ignoring the distance between a function (in the 
narrow sense) computed and the whole agent’s behavior. In this way, Shea might identify 
success conditions connected to many steps in the production of even the most pathological or 
biologically counter-productive behavior. 
 This approach may hold promise, but undoubtedly there be monsters. To the extent that 
human behavior is the computing of functions, it is a mess of noise and imprecision. Even when 
bits of the brain compute functions, the process is often sloppy and imprecise, and which 
functions are being computed is shifting and frequently assembled on the fly (Anderson 2014). 
The functions that seem most likely to be stable and precise are the most narrowly defined (e.g., 
“compute retinal disparity”); but, at least if we focus on more complex and interesting forms of 
behavior – the results of so-called higher cognition – these functions are unlikely to issue directly 
in behavior; rather, their effects will be combined with and modulated by architectural facts, 
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further operations, mechanisms computing other functions, and more, all of which co-contribute 
to the production of the behavior that a narrowly defined function helps to produce. As often as 
not, orderly behavior emerges from the brain by hook or crook, by passing control among a 
shifting set of dominant networks and subnetworks, each of which involves various areas and the 
computing of many functions at simultaneously – bleeding into one another, interfering with one 
another, competing with one another. Reinforcement algorithms (and their evolutionary 
analogues) might solve credit-assignment problems well enough, allowing for the application of 
Shea’s framework to whatever determinate functions are being computed in the production of 
behavior, perhaps thereby allowing for the grounding of all representational content in the 
computing of such functions, but this is an ambitious hope.14 15 
 To be fair, much of Shea’s framework might prove exceptionally useful, even if he 
abandons his normative conception of the explananda of cognitive science. The workings of 
complex, kludgey processes consistently and robustly produce human behavior that deviates 
from the null hypothesis. And, it’s not implausible that causal explanations of the (relative) 
 
14 Shea might lean on the competence-performance distinction here to shore up claims to determinacy, but this kind 
of response has its limits. The messiness of the human brain’s functioning – the extent to which approximations of 
function emerge from complex interactions of noisy, imprecise, biology-corrupted computations – belie claims to 
determinate competence, fixed by learning or evolutionary selection. Compare: I might claim that I have the 
competence to play tennis as well as Roger Federer – a competence I simply never perform in keeping with – but 
someone who looks inside me at the motor and muscular mechanisms that generate my on-court behavior will 
rightly see through my claim to competence. 
15 Many influential cognitive scientists might seem to be in Shea’s corner: David Marr, David Robinson, John 
Anderson, and Tom Griffiths all have, at one point or another, emphasized ideal rationality or abstract function over 
messy details. But, upon closer look, such authors often pitch the computational level, adaptive rationality, and 
Bayesianism about the brain as part of what used to be called “the context of discovery”; thinking in terms of 
optimal behavior is an efficient way of discovering models of the (typically messy) mechanisms that produce actual 
human behavior, which is normally only a very limited approximation to optimality. For Marr, the computational 
level clearly plays a guiding, epistemic role (1982, 27). We don’t stand a chance, he seems to think, of figuring out 
what the brain is doing if we don’t ask what input-output functions would be useful for it to compute. For Griffiths, 
it’s matter of exploring the space of models efficiently; we could proceed bottom-up, from neural mechanisms to the 
construction of models of performance, but that approach is likely to lead to a long string of dead ends, whereas 
focus on optimality, as a working assumption, will likely lead more quickly to successful models of (suboptimal) 
performance (e.g., Griffiths et al. 2010, 363). 
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stabilization of that robustness could ground representational content in at least roughly the way 
Shea describes.16 
III. Pluralism, Multidimensional Analysis, and the Personal Level 
I suggest recasting the discussion of mental representation in the language of statistical 
modeling. We should define historical, possibly content-fixing relations – teleological or 
learning-based – as variables in a collection of quantities the dependence relations among which 
might or might not be correlated in significant ways. The strength, over some definite period of 
time (e.g., over the subject’s past), of the co-occurrence of the activation of the unit in question 
and the appearance of some possibly represented feature might itself be represented as a variable. 
We can then ask to what extent that quantity accounts for variance in other quantities measured 
behaviorally; 17 to put matters more crudely, we can ask such questions as, “Does the strength of 
the co-variation between Pat’s appearance in the room and the activation of the unit in question, 
as determined by the subject’s history, account for variance in the probability that the subject 
greets Pat when Pat is encountered at testing time?” This way of approaching representational 
content accommodates a multivariate approach to content determination, allowing us to see how 
different kinds of processes or relations – possibly including stabilization by learning, past causal 
interaction, evolutionary selection, and others – might contribute, to differing degrees, to the 
production of the subject’s behavior, with different factors accounting for different amounts of 
the subject’s deviation from the null hypothesis.18 
 
16 I myself attempted to work out a story in this vicinity (Rupert 1998, 1999, 2001), one focusing heavily on 
developmental processes; for an update of sorts, see Rupert (2018a). For a project embracing mental representation 
without rules or tidy computing, see Horgan and Tienson (1996). 
17 Shea’s discussion of the evidential test (89–91) suggests this kind of approach. Note that the quantities in question 
can include the extent to which a correlation has contributed to stabilization in the subject’s use of a given 
algorithm. 
18 Cf. Shea’s comments about pluralism (66). 
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 Such an approach might naturally allow Shea to abandon what strikes me as his 
unmotivated deference to the so-called personal-subpersonal distinction (8, 26, 42, 134, 162), 
which, so far as I can tell, plays no role in cognitive-scientific modeling (Rupert 2018b). 
Consider one of the four cases that Shea treats as a personal-level form of behavior and thus 
treats as off limits in the context of his project: “explaining to others what we believe and why 
we act as we do” (26). Clearly cognitive science should want to model such behavior; it should 
not be set aside when developing a naturalistic account of representational content informed by 
the role of representation in cognitive science. Of course, one might choose to call states that 
produce such behavior “personal-level states,” but the implication concerning levels seems 
downright misleading (Rey 2001, Drayson 2014). Such states contribute, as nodes in a network 
model or in some other form of statistical model, to the production of the relevant behavior, right 
alongside states that Shea would categorize as subpersonal. The result of banishing the personal-
subpersonal distinction might be greater fidelity to cognitive science, perhaps via the 
development of multivariate models that include explicit attitudes (Perugini 2005) and conscious 
states in the same analytic framework as neural bits that, for instance, compute retinal disparity. 
This would allow Shea to pursue a more inclusive approach to cognitive science, one that 
extends to all aspects of it – including accounts of the forms of behavior associated with the 
phenomena he brackets as personal level – when developing and applying a naturalistic 
semantics for mental representations. 
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